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Exploiting a unique data set containing transactions data from a panel of 769 Chinese state-
owned enterprises between 1980 and 1989, this paper tests microeconomic implications of a
pervasive form of corruption—oﬃcial diversion of under-priced, in-plan goods to the market.
Corruption has the predicted eﬀects on resource allocation. Oﬃcial under-pricing of in-plan
goods, which lowers the marginal cost of diversion, increases the procurement of output into
the plan for the purpose of diversion. Market competition introduced by allowing ﬁrms to sell
directly to the market appears to reduce corruption and therefore lessen its distortions.
JEL classiﬁcation: L51, L12, P21
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Shleifer and Vishny (1993) deﬁne corruption as the sale of government-produced goods or
services by public oﬃcials for private gain. They argue that corruption is distortionary and
detrimental to economic development. Indeed corruption is thought to be particularly pervasive
in transition and developing economies.1 Using available cross-country aggregate data, recent
empirical work (e.g., Mauro (1995) and Wei (2000)) conﬁrms a link between higher perceived
corruption and lower investment and growth. However, studies using aggregate data cannot
analyze the behavioral implications of corruption models,2 nor examine the microeconomic
mechanisms by which corruption distorts resource allocation.
Empirical analysis of the microeconomics of corruption can shed considerable light on the
economic nature of corrupt practices—the linkage between bureaucratic control and corruption
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999), and the impact of corruption on resource allocation. It can also guide
policies that may limit corruption and lessen its distortions. But collecting microeconomic
data on corrupt transactions is itself a tall order. Fortunately, micro data that objectively
document some aspects of corruption are available from a survey of Chinese state-owned enter-
prises operating under China’s dual-track (plan/market) system. Under this system, a speciﬁc
form of corruption—the diversion by oﬃcials of under-priced in-plan resources to outside-plan
customers—was pervasive.
The usefulness of the data owes much to the experimental nature of the Chinese economic
reforms. Before full implementation of the “dual-track” system, oﬃcial diversion thrived,
even in the absence of a formal product market. It was not uncommon for a corrupt oﬃcial
who controlled the in-plan allocation to divert under-priced in-plan goods to outside-plan
customers in exchange for favors and in-kind gifts (e.g., “back door” access to scarce consumer
goods).3 But the implicit outside-plan prices at which the diverted in-plan goods were sold—
key variables inﬂuencing corrupt transactions—were unobservable. The introduction of the
1According to the widely used Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International (2000)
for 90 economies around the world,economies that are considered more corrupt than the median are all de-
veloping and transition economies. This index is compiled based on a “poll of polls” drawing upon numerous
distinct surveys of (non-domestic) expert and general public views of the extent of corruption.
2Rose-Ackerman (1998,p. 36) argues that “[t]o go beyond macroeconomic ﬁndings it is necessary to isolate
the structural features that create incentives for corrupt behavior.”
3While accepting cash bribes was considered a crime in China,receiving most of the in-kind payoﬀs was not.
Without an anonymous product market oﬀering luxury consumer goods on which corrupt oﬃcials could spend
their illicit incomes,cash bribes were less valuable than in-kind bribes. It is not surprising that corruption was
not considered a pervasive problem before 1979 when the reforms started.
1dual-track system altered the environment of oﬃcial diversion. Under the new system, a state-
owned ﬁrm was no longer a passive production unit that turned over its entire output to the
plan. After fulﬁlling its plan obligations, the ﬁrm under the dual-track system could produce
extra outside-plan output and sell it directly to customers at a “ﬂoating” or market price. The
government regulated the “ﬂoating prices” initially, but liberalized the prices on outside-plan
transactions on January 1, 1985. The dual-track system thus created a formal product market
parallel to planning. Corrupt oﬃcials could and allegedly did divert under-priced in-plan goods
that they controlled from the plan and sold them on the product markets at higher market
prices after 1985. The uniqueness of the data is that both in-plan quotas that state-owned
ﬁrms faced and indexes of the plan prices and the market prices that the corrupt oﬃcials faced
are observed.
Using this dataset, I address the following questions in this study: How did corruption
aﬀect the allocation of in-plan resources (i.e., the setting of output and input quotas that
ﬁrms faced) and outside-plan resources? How did the introduction of market competition
change corruption, and its impact on resource allocation?
Given the speciﬁc nature of the economic institutions in China, I brieﬂy describe in Section 2
the dual-track system and oﬃcial diversion. To derive testable implications regarding oﬃcial
diversion in China, I then extend Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) model of corruption in Section 3.
Shleifer and Vishny show that a corrupt oﬃcial will behave as a bribe-maximizing monopolist
if he can restrict the supply of a government-produced good. In the case without theft, the
oﬃcial turns over the oﬃcial plan price for that good to the government. A decrease in the
plan price, which lowers the oﬃcial’s marginal cost of corruption, increases corruption. The
marginal cost of producing the good is immaterial to the oﬃcial as the cost is borne by the
government. This model corresponds closely to the situation in China.
There is, however, an important diﬀerence in the underlying institutions. In Shleifer and
Vishny (1993), the producer is passive. Under China’s dual-track system, the state-owned
ﬁrm can sell its outside-plan output directly in the market after it has fulﬁlled its in-plan
output quota set by the oﬃcial. As a result, a corrupt oﬃcial (distinct from the ﬁrm) who
diverts in-plan goods would face product market competition from the ﬁrm and possibly other
competitors. A decrease in the plan price still increases corruption. But other predictions
diﬀer. In particular, while the marginal cost of production remains immaterial to the corrupt
oﬃcial, an increase in marginal cost may cause the ﬁrm to raise output price in the market,
thereby widening the gap between market and plan prices. The resulting increase in the net
2marginal beneﬁt of diversion may then induce the oﬃcial to increase the procurement of quotas
for the purpose of diversion. Product market competition introduced by allowing state ﬁrms
to sell directly to the market (and by lowering entry barriers for non-state ﬁrms (Li, 1997))
will reduce the net marginal beneﬁts of corruption and therefore lessen corruption distortions.
Consistent with these predictions, the empirical results presented in Section 4 reveal that
corruption had a signiﬁcant impact on the allocation of in-plan resources between 1980 and
1989. The procurement of in-plan goods by oﬃcials decreases with the plan price and increases
with the marginal cost of production. Interestingly, the evidence shows that there is little
qualitative diﬀerence in how oﬃcial diversion aﬀected the allocation of in-plan resources before
and after the price liberalization in 1985. It thus suggests that oﬃcial diversion existed before
the 1985 price liberalization and that corrupt oﬃcials made diversion decisions before 1985
based on the implicit prices that embodied in-kind bribes.
Corruption also had a signiﬁcant impact on market allocation and was aﬀected by market
competition. Output pricing regression models reveal that an increase in the output quota had
a negative eﬀect on the market price of output (after controlling for the implied endogeneity
of the quota), indicating that the dual-track system changed the industrial organization of
oﬃcial diversion in China. The market competition created by allowing ﬁrms to sell directly
to the markets where diverted goods are also sold, ceteris paribus, has resulted in lower market
prices, higher output, and lower corruption distortions. The evidence reveals that, while the
dual-track system provided the fodder for sustaining corruption by maintaining the plan, the
competition that it fostered by allowing ﬁrms to sell outside-plan output directly to the market
(and by lowering entry barriers for non-state ﬁrms) appears to have mitigated corruption to
some extent.
2 The Dual-Track System and Corruption
The dual-track system began its gradual emergence in the late 1970s when the Chinese govern-
ment allowed state-owned ﬁrms to sell outside-plan outputs at “ﬂoating prices.” Still subject
to price control, “ﬂoating prices” could not exceed plan prices by more than 20 percent. On
January 1, 1985, the government lifted these price controls on outside-plan transactions.
Under the dual-track system, a state-owned ﬁrm must deliver its compulsory output quota
to a relevant branch of the Material Supply Bureau (MSB) at the plan price. In return, it
may receive some in-plan allocation of inputs (i.e., input quotas) at plan input prices. After
3fulﬁlling its plan obligations, the ﬁrm may then produce outside-plan output and sell it to the
market. But it must buy any additional material inputs from the market as well. Plan prices
continue to be set centrally by the State Price Bureau at levels often substantially lower than
market prices.4 MSB oﬃcials control the allocation of in-plan resources (Byrd, 1992). Given
the hierarchical nature of the MSB organization, each state-owned ﬁrm may deal with multiple
MSB oﬃcials with some division of responsibility for particular products and material inputs.
To illustrate how the dual-track system worked in practice, I present in Table 1 some statis-
tics on state-owned enterprises’ transactions under the dual-track system. (A brief description
of the enterprise survey data is given in the Appendix.) Table 1 shows that the price liberal-
ization in 1985 markedly raised market price inﬂation. In an eﬀort to combat rising inﬂation in
the late 1980s, the government restricted the increases in plan prices, causing the gap between
market and plan prices to widen considerably in the late 1980s. The data also reveal another
interesting fact. While the output quota per ﬁrm grew by 37 percent in real terms between
1981 and 1990, the amount of input quota delivered to an average sample ﬁrm fell by more than
12 percent in real terms. Net contribution of resources to the plan per sample ﬁrm (Column 4
minus Column 8) increased from 16.2 to 30.1 million yuan between 1981 and 1989. Given that
the sample is quite representative of the Chinese state-owned industry,5 state-owned industrial
ﬁrms appeared to be increasingly signiﬁcant net contributors to the plan.
Material balance in the plan, however, requires that resources procured from state-owned
ﬁrms (sources) equal in-plan uses, which comprise resources allocated to in-plan intermediate
uses and to in-plan ﬁnal uses (i.e., consumption, investment, net exports, and changes in
inventory). One would thus expect that the net contribution to the plan shown in the data
should have been allocated to non-industrial in-plan intermediate uses and to in-plan ﬁnal uses.
Using Chinese input-output tables, Li (2001) ﬁnds that even after taking into account possible
in-plan non-industrial intermediate uses and ﬁnal uses, in-plan procurement still exceeded
accountable in-plan uses by a signiﬁcant margin. In other word, there were leakages in the
plan: more resources were procured into the plan than were allocated within the plan. The
apparent leakages are puzzling.
A plausible explanation, oﬀered by Chinese journalists and economists, and often based on
ﬁrst-hand observations, was that substantial amounts of in-plan goods were diverted out of the
4Plan prices were determined based on a set of cost-plus rules (see “Wujia Wenjian Xuebian: 1979–1983”
(Selected Pricing Regulations),Price Research Institute,State Price Bureau,1984).
5See Li (1994) and Li (1997) for more detailed discussions of the sample characteristics
4plan by oﬃcials who sought to capture the rents created by the under-pricing of in-plan goods
(Huang, 1996). That is, the leakages in the plan represented “guandao” or oﬃcial diversion.
Browsing Chinese newspapers and magazines published in the late 1980s, one cannot help but
notice a growing perception of the pervasiveness of oﬃcial diversion. A common scheme used
by corrupt oﬃcials was to create a web of trading companies, otherwise known as “briefcase
companies” whose tangible assets (e.g., business cards and company seals) could easily ﬁt into
a briefcase. Often these trading companies were aﬃliated with the MSBs or state-owned ﬁrms,
and were entitled to distribute in-plan goods. Through repeated self-dealing, i.e., repeatedly
selling in-plan goods from one briefcase company to the next for a small markup, a corrupt
oﬃcial could easily raise the price of the in-plan goods to its market clearing level before
oﬄoading the goods to users at market or implicit market-clearing prices. Huang (1996, p. 177)
reports that in Shenyang the title to a shipment of cold-rolled steel plates was ﬂipped multiple
times among briefcase companies before it was delivered to the user, raising the price per ton
from 1400 yuan to 7200 yuan.
Since oﬃcial diversion was illegal, MSB oﬃcials often sought protection by bribing law
enforcement oﬃcers, and the managers whose ﬁrms’ proﬁts were pillaged by diversion. How-
ever, collusion between MSB oﬃcials and ﬁrm managers was often tenuous. In detailed case
studies of manufacturers in China, Byrd (1992, p. 323 and 392) found that the MSB would
raise procurement quotas on their outputs when demand for them was strong and force the
ﬁrms to sell to the market on their own when the demand was weak. Byrd (p. 392) concluded
that “[s]upervisory authorities [MSBs] acted largely as self-interested entities promoting their
own beneﬁts and protecting their own interests, with little regard for [the producers].” It thus
appears that corruption may have played a role in the allocation of in-plan resources.
3 The Model
In Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) basic model of corruption, a corrupt oﬃcial who is the monopoly
seller of a government-produced good maximizes bribes by restricting the supply of the good.
As depicted in Figure 1, a decrease in the oﬃcial price, p, increases both bribes and the quantity
of corrupt sales. But corruption is not aﬀected by the cost of production, which is borne by
the government and hence immaterial to the oﬃcial. Reducing the oﬃcial’s market power by
introducing competition reduces corruption distortions.
To test these predictions using the Chinese data, one must consider how the predictions
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that stylized features of the Chinese institutions can be summarized as follows. 1) Output
and input quotas are likely set by diﬀerent oﬃcials. The ﬁrm under study may face an output
oﬃcial with control rights over the procurement of its output into the plan, and an input
oﬃcial with control rights over the allocation of the ﬁrm’s in-plan input. 2) Plan prices and
base wage rates are determined by the central government, and thus are exogenous to the
oﬃcials and the ﬁrm. 3) Corrupt oﬃcials may face competition in the product market, since
ﬁrms can sell directly to the market. 4) The ﬁrm and the oﬃcials may not collude perfectly,
so their objectives may diverge: while the corrupt oﬃcials maximize corruption rents, the ﬁrm
may be more interested in proﬁts. But if the output oﬃcials and the ﬁrm collude perfectly
so that they jointly maximize corruption rents (and the government picks up any losses or
proﬁts that the ﬁrm incurs), they should behave in the same way as the monopoly oﬃcial in
Shleifer and Vishny’s model. To the extent that Shleifer and Vishny’s predictions diﬀer from
the implications of corruption under imperfect collusion to be derived below, the hypothesis
of imperfect collusion can be tested.
Consider ﬁrst the simple case of perfectly competitive product markets where both the
ﬁrm and the oﬃcials take the market output price P and the market input price M as given.
The ﬁrm produces an output using labor and an intermediate input produced by an input
producer. The output oﬃcial procures the output quota Q from the ﬁrm at the plan price p.
The input oﬃcial allocates the input quota X to the ﬁrm at the plan price m. Assume that
the output oﬃcial is required under the plan to transfer to the plan a ﬁxed fraction, 1 − δ,o f
the output quota Q, where δ ∈ (0,1), and can divert δQ to the market. Similarly, diversion
may occur as the input oﬃcial makes procurement and allocation decisions. Let Q∗ denote the
input oﬃcial’s procurement from the ﬁrm’s input producer. The input oﬃcial allocates to the
ﬁrm X =( 1− δ∗)Q∗ as its input quota, but can divert δ∗Q∗ to the market.6 The output and
input oﬃcials’ payoﬀs from diversion can be expressed as
RO =( P − p)δQ− CO(δQ),R I =( M − m)δ∗Q∗ − CI(δ∗Q∗)( 1 )
where CO(δQ)a n dCI(δ∗Q∗) are the total costs of diversion. The costs include expected
punishments for corruption, which are expected to be convex. The output and input oﬃcials’
6One can endogenize δ and δ
∗ without changing the derived testable implications. Since δ and δ
∗ are
unobservable,such a generalization is superﬂuous for the purpose of this paper.
6diversion problems are thus symmetrical. Below I focus on discussing the implications of output
diversion since the implications of input diversion can be obtained analogously.
In equilibrium, the output oﬃcial sets the output quota Q to equate the marginal beneﬁt
and cost of diversion. The optimal output quota Q(P,p) should increase with P and decrease
with p, since an increase in P or a decrease in p raises the net marginal beneﬁt from diverting
Q. But since the cost of production is immaterial to the oﬃcial, neither M nor the base wage
rate that the ﬁrm faces, W, should aﬀect Q. By analogy, the optimal input quota X(M,m),
as a fraction of the procurement Q∗ imposed on the input producer, should increase with M
and decrease with m.A n dX should not be aﬀected by the cost of producing the input—the
market price of other inputs, M∗, and the wage rate, W∗, that the input producer faces. The
comparative statics results for Q and X are listed in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.
The implications of corruption are diﬀerent when sellers have market power in the emerging
product markets. Given that the oﬃcials have the control right over the allocation of in-plan
resources, the interaction between the oﬃcials and the ﬁrm can be modeled as a two-stage
game:7 The oﬃcials set Q and X ﬁrst, and then the ﬁrm names P after observing Q and X.
Consider ﬁrst the ﬁrm’s pricing decision. Having market power as a seller in the output
market, the ﬁrm faces a downward sloping residual demand curve d(P,Q) for its outside-plan
output. Since diversion and in-plan allocation “steal” some of the ﬁrm’s customers, d(P,Q)i s
in general decreasing in Q. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts from meeting both its mandatory output quota
Q and its residual market demand d(P,Q) can be written as
Π=( P − C)d(P,Q)+( p − C)Q +( M − m)X (2)
where C = C(M,W) is the marginal cost, which increases with M and W. The ﬁrm, max-
imizing Π, sets its optimal price to equate the marginal revenue from market sales and the
marginal cost of production,8 as shown in Panel A, Figure 2. The optimal price, P(Q,M,W),
should in general be a function that decreases with Q and increases with the marginal cost
of production, i.e., M and W. This is intuitive. By increasing Q, the oﬃcial “steals” some
additional customers from the ﬁrm and thus limits the ﬁrm’s market power and its ability
7This implicitly assumes that the oﬃcials can credibly pre-commit to their setting of Q and X.T h i sm a yb e
a strong assumption. Byrd (1992,p. 321) documented in a case study that Anshan,a steel maker,complained
about delayed announcement of plan targets. If the oﬃcial cannot credibly pre-commit,it may be appropriate to
assume that the two parties move simultaneously. But this change doesn’t alter the model’s testable predictions.
8Proﬁt maximization may be a simplistic description of the ﬁrm’s objective. But what matters here is that
the ﬁrm doesn’t ignore the proﬁt incentive introduced by the reforms (Li,1997) in making decisions.
7to raise price. And since neither X, p,n o rm aﬀect the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue or marginal
cost, the optimal P should not be aﬀected by X, p or m. The comparative statics results are
summarized in the third column in Table 2.
Anticipating the ﬁrm’s pricing decision P(Q,M,W), the output oﬃcial sets Q to maximize
RO by equating the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost from diversion. The equilibrium
is depicted in Panel B, Figure 2.9 In choosing Q, the output oﬃcial takes into account the
anticipated decrease in P as he increases Q, as if he faces a downward sloping demand curve for
the diverted good. As in Shleifer and Vishny (1993), an increase in p raises the marginal cost
of diversion and therefore reduces Q. However, m has no eﬀect on Q when diversion of output
and input quotas are done independently by diﬀerent oﬃcials. Unlike Shleifer and Vishny
(1993), the marginal cost of production may matter here because of the potential competition
between the oﬃcial and the ﬁrm. An increase in the marginal cost of production forces the
producer to raise output price. This in turn increases the marginal beneﬁt of diversion and
thus induces the output oﬃcial to increase the output quota for the purpose of diversion. The
optimal output quota Q(p,M,W) is thus expected to decrease in p, and increase in M and W,
as summarized in Column 4, Table 2.
While the ﬁrm, as a buyer, takes M as given, the input oﬃcial may have market power as
a seller in the input market. The input oﬃcial’s problem is thus analytically identical to that
of the output oﬃcial. By analogy, Q∗ and hence X =( 1− δ∗)Q∗ should decrease with m and
increase with the marginal cost of producing the input, or M∗ and W∗. The optimal input
quota allocated to the ﬁrm can be written as X(m,M∗,W∗). The comparative statics results
for X are listed in Column 5 in Table 2.
4 Empirical Evidence
To test the derived implications using the available ﬁrm-level panel data described in the
Appendix, I ﬁrst discuss the selection of econometric speciﬁcations. I then present and analyze
the empirical results.
A. Econometric methods. Consider ﬁrst the speciﬁcation under the hypothesis that
sellers have market power. As discussed, structural relations that determine ﬁrm n’s (log)
9Since the oﬃcial cannot impose a negative output quota,he faces the constraint Q ≥ 0. Panel B in Figure 2
characterizes an interior equilibrium where Q>0. But if the oﬃcial cannot proﬁtably set Q>0,he would set
Q =0i fP|Q=0 <p+ C
 
O|Q=0. Factors that decrease Q in an interior equilibrium are thus the ones that raise
the likelihood of a boundary equilibrium.
8market price in year t,l nPnt, and output quota, Qnt, can be expressed as
lnPnt = αQQnt + αXXnt + αW lnWnt + αM lnMnt +   
nt (3)
Qnt = βp lnpnt + βW lnWnt + βM lnMnt + βm lnmnt + ξ 
nt (4)
where Wnt, Mnt, pnt and mnt are, respectively, the base wage rate, the market price of input,
the plan prices of output and input that ﬁrm n faces in year t;a n d  
nt and ξ 
nt are random
errors (not necessarily of mean zero). The included regressors are exogenous to the output
oﬃcial and the ﬁrm. Similarly, the input quote equation can be written as
Xnt = γp lnpnt + γW lnWnt + γm lnmnt + η 
nt (5)
where the included variables are exogenous to the input oﬃcial, and η 
nt represents a random
error. The empirical task is to estimate these equations and test the theoretical predictions as
summarized in Table 2.
As they stand, the equations are not estimable due to the following data limitations. First,
while price indexes are available, price levels are unobserved (see the Appendix). In addition,
genuine market prices did not exist before 1985, and the implicit market prices were unobserv-
able. Second, the observed output and input quotas are censored since a signiﬁcant number
of ﬁrms reported zero output or input quotas (see the Appendix). And ﬁnally, two variables
that aﬀect Xnt—the base wage rate W∗
nt and the market input price M∗
nt that ﬁrm n’s input
suppliers face—are unobserved and hence omitted from (5). Below I address the econometric
issues imposed by the data limitations on each equation and outline an estimable speciﬁcation.
1. The output quota equation. The theory implies that censored output quota observations
can be written as Qnt =m a x {Q0
nt,0}, where Q0
nt is the latent output quota expressed in (4) (see
footnote 9). By substituting in the observed price indexes, pi
nt ≡ pnt/pn,80, Mi
nt ≡ Mnt/Mn,80,
and mi
nt ≡ mnt/mn,80, one obtains a ﬁxed-eﬀects Tobit speciﬁcation,
Qnt =m a x {βp lnpi
nt + βW lnWnt + βM lnMi




t + ξnt,0} (6)
where µ
q
n, after absorbing βp lnpn,80 + βM lnMn,80 + βm lnmn,80, represents the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
eﬀects, ν
q
t the time-speciﬁc eﬀects, and ξnt the idiosyncratic error. In general, µ
q
n also captures
the eﬀects on Qnt of unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors such as time-invariant product character-
istics and oﬃcial-ﬁrm relationships, while ν
q
t captures the eﬀects of unobserved macroeconomic
9factors that aﬀect all ﬁrms, such as inﬂation and nationwide anti-corruption campaigns. Given
the available data, (6) can be estimated consistently using Honor´ e’s (1992) semi-parametric
method for ﬁxed-eﬀects Tobit models.
2. The input quota equation. Similarly, (5) can be speciﬁed as a ﬁxed-eﬀects Tobit model,
Xnt =m a x {γp lnpi
nt + γW lnWnt + γm lnmi
nt + µx
n + νx
t + ηnt,0} (7)
where µx
n and νx
t are the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁc eﬀects, and ηnt is the idiosyncratic
error. Honor´ e’s (1992) Tobit can be applied to (7), but the estimates may be contaminated
by omitted variables. Conditional on the ﬁxed eﬀects, the error term ηnt may contain certain
idiosyncratic components of the omitted variables, lnW∗
nt and lnM∗
nt. Since changes in the
base wage rate are often coordinated by the central government, it is likely that lnWnt is
positively correlated with lnW∗
nt. It is also possible that lnmi
nt is positively correlated with
lnM∗
nt and lnW∗
nt, if changes in the plan price of the input producer’s output follow changes
in its production cost. As a result, estimates of the coeﬃcients on lnmi
nt and lnWnt are likely
biased upward. But these biases cannot be ascertained without additional data.
3. The pricing equation for t ≥ 1985. Since market prices did not exist before 1985, the
pricing equation is estimable for the post-liberalization period. I apply a ﬁrst-order diﬀerence
on both sides of (3) to eliminate the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects. Let ∆ denote the ﬁrst diﬀerence
operator such that ∆lnPi
nt =l nPi
nt − lnPi
n,t−1. This transformation yields,
∆lnPi
nt = αQ∆Qnt + αX∆Xnt + αW∆lnWnt + αM∆lnMi
nt + ν
p
t +  nt (8)
OLS estimates of (8) are likely biased since ∆Qnt and ∆Xnt are themselves endogenous. For
one, ∆Qnt is likely positively correlated with  nt: an upward shift in the market demand for
the output that increases  nt and hence Pnt should induce the output oﬃcial to raise Qnt.T o
estimate (8) consistently, I use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM, Hansen (1982))
with these instrumental variables: ∆lnpi
nt,∆l nmi
nt,∆l nMi
nt,∆l nWnt, a constant, and year
dummies. These variables should be correlated with the regressors in (8) but not with the
idiosyncratic error  nt. The GMM estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal.
Equations (6)–(8) are speciﬁed under the hypothesis of imperfect competition. But they
can be readily adapted for the case where product markets are perfectly competitive. As




nt in (7) as additional regressors, and dropping (8) as the market price
is exogenous to the ﬁrm. Given that the implications of perfect competition and imperfect
competition are diﬀerent (see Table 2), the null hypothesis of perfect competition can be easily
tested against the alternative joint hypothesis of imperfect competition.
B. Empirical results. Table 3 reports four sets of estimates of the output quota equa-
tion (6) using ﬁxed-eﬀects Tobit. The time-speciﬁc eﬀects, estimated by including year dum-
mies in the regression, are not reported here. The ﬁrst three columns present two sets of
estimates under the hypothesis that sellers have market power in the product markets. Col-
umn 1 reports estimates obtained under the restriction that equation coeﬃcients are time
invariant. This restriction is relaxed for estimates in Columns 2 and 3 to allow coeﬃcients to
diﬀer before and after the price liberalization in January 1985. Columns 4 to 6 report the same
two sets of estimates under the hypothesis of perfect competition, where an additional regres-
sor, “log market output price,” is included in the regression. Table 4 reports the same four
sets of estimates for the input quota equation (7) using ﬁxed-eﬀects Tobit. The output quota
regressions use 7038 observations, while the input quota regressions use 4434 observations,
reﬂecting the fact that the input quota variable has a larger number of missing observations.
Inspection of the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst three columns of Tables 3
and 4 reveals that all variables operate more or less as predicted under the hypothesis of
imperfect competition (see Columns 4 and 5, Table 2). Focus ﬁrst on the estimates in Table 3.
“Log plan output price” increases corrupt oﬃcials’ marginal cost of diversion. It should reduce
the amount of output quota that the oﬃcial procures and diverts. The estimated negative
coeﬃcients on this variable conﬁrm this prediction. “Log market input price” and “log base
wage rate” both increase the marginal cost of production that the ﬁrm faces, and should raise
the market price of output for any given output quota. Since the resulting upward shift in the
market price increases the marginal beneﬁt from diverting output quota, the oﬃcial should
have a strong incentive to raise the output quota. As expected, the estimated coeﬃcients on
both variables are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. There is a negative but (statistically)
insigniﬁcant eﬀect of the plan price of input on output quota. This is consistent with the
assumption that output and input quotas are diverted independently by diﬀerent oﬃcials.
Turn next to the estimates of the input quota equation (7) in Table 4 under the hypothesis
of imperfect competition. As discussed, the estimates may be aﬀected by omitted-variables
biases. In particular, the estimates of the coeﬃcients on lnWnt and lnmi
nt m a yb eb i a s e d
upward. Since lnWnt is expected to have no eﬀect on Xnt, an upward bias here should be
11easily observable if it is present. Table 4 shows that the biases appear to be concentrated
in the second half of the 1980s. As predicted, the estimates of the coeﬃcient on lnmi
nt are
negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the expected upward biases in these
estimates are too small to alter the qualitative eﬀect of lnmi
nt on Xnt.
But the upward biases may still have non-negligible quantitative eﬀects. Inspection of
Tables 3 and 4 shows that the estimates of the marginal eﬀect of lnmi
nt on Xnt are much
smaller in magnitude than the estimates of the marginal eﬀect of lnpnt on Qnt. Part of the
diﬀerence may be the biases that reduce the magnitude of the estimated marginal eﬀect of
lnmi
nt on Xnt. But even in the absence of omitted-variables biases, the marginal eﬀect of
the plan price on the input quota Xnt should be less than that on output quota Qnt since
Xnt represents only a portion (1 − δ∗) of the amount (Q∗) procured from the input producer.
Without additional data, however, it is not possible to ascertain the size of the biases.
In contrast, inspection of the estimates in the last three columns of Table 3 reveals that
most of the variables do not operate as predicted under the hypothesis of perfect competition.
Theoretically, an increase in lnPi
nt raises the marginal beneﬁt of diversion. Holding everything
else constant, this should increase Qnt. Estimates of the coeﬃcient on lnPi
nt, however, are
negative and statistically insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. Estimates of the remaining coeﬃcients
are qualitatively similar to those in Columns 1-3, even though in theory they should be dif-
ferent.10 Inspection of the estimates in the last three columns of Table 4 also reveals that
most of the variables do not operate as predicted under the hypothesis of perfect competition.
Theoretically, an increase in Mi
nt or a decrease in mi
nt raises the net marginal beneﬁt of input
diversion. Holding everything else constant, either change should increase Xnt. But estimates
of the coeﬃcient on lnMi
nt are negative and statistically signiﬁcant, while those on lnmi
nt
are insigniﬁcant. The inconsistencies between theory and empirics under perfect competition
provide strong evidence against the hypothesis of perfect competition. They suggest that the
market prices should be treated as endogenous variables. In the discussion below, I maintain
the hypothesis that sellers have market power in product markets.
The evidence is also inconsistent with the implications of perfect collusion between the
oﬃcial and the ﬁrm. As discussed in Section 3, if the oﬃcial and the ﬁrm collude perfectly
in diversion, Qnt should not be aﬀected by Mnt or Wnt. The data contradict this prediction,
suggesting that there perhaps are suﬃcient conﬂicts of interest between the oﬃcial and the
10For example,under perfect competition,both M
i
nt and Wnt should have negligible impact on Qnt.
12ﬁrm. In particular, given the evidence, the ﬁrm may face suﬃciently strong proﬁt incentives,
so sharing some diversion proceeds may not alter its behavior qualitatively.
To what extent did the eﬀects of corruption on resource allocation change as a result of
market price liberalization in 1985? Inspection of the estimates before and after the liberal-
ization as reported in Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 shows that there is little qualitative change
in how the output quota responds to changes in the included variables. Inspection of the
estimates in Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 would probably lead to the same conclusion when
the omitted-variable biases are taken into account. The results reveal strikingly that even
before the full implementation of the dual-track system, the allocation of in-plan resources is
consistent with the hypothesis of corruption. They suggest that oﬃcial diversion thrived even
in the absence of a functioning product market, and that corrupt oﬃcials could have relied on
implicit or black-market prices in making allocation decisions before prices were liberalized.
But there are quantitative diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients. The estimated marginal
eﬀect of the plan price on output quota is stronger before price liberalization: a one percentage
point increase in the plan price would reduce the output quota by 73,000 yuan in the 1980–84
period and by 56,600 yuan in the 1985–89 period. The estimated eﬀects of lnMi
nt and lnWnt
on Qnt are stronger after the liberalization. A one percentage point increase in the market
input price would increase output quota by 37,400 yuan in the 1980–84 period and by 42,000
yuan in the 1985–89 period. The increase between the two periods in the marginal eﬀect of
lnWnt on Qnt is even stronger—from 11,500 yuan per one percentage point increase in lnWnt
to 65,500 yuan. Wald tests, conducted separately for each coeﬃcient pair, rejected at 5%
signiﬁcant level only the hypothesis that the coeﬃcient on lnWnt is identical before and after
the liberalization. The post-liberalization decrease in the estimated marginal eﬀect of the plan
price on output quota is not statistically signiﬁcant. The increase in the response of output
quota to changes in the base wage rate, and less statistically signiﬁcantly in the market price
of input, is probably due to the increased product market competition in the 1980s (Li, 1997).
As increased competition squeezes a ﬁrm’s proﬁt margin tighter, an increase in the marginal
cost of production will likely be passed through more fully to customers in the form of higher
output prices. This in turn would induce an increase in output quota.
To analyze the eﬀect of competition more directly, I turn now to the GMM estimates of
output pricing equation (8) for the post-liberalization period. The results are reported in
Table 5. Since allowing the ﬁrm to sell directly to customers introduces competition between
the ﬁrm and the oﬃcial, the output quota imposed on the ﬁrm should have a negative eﬀect on
13the market price. The estimated coeﬃcient on ∆Qnt is negative and statistically signiﬁcant,
conﬁrming the predicted eﬀect of competition between the ﬁrm and the oﬃcial. Also expected,
the estimated coeﬃcient on ∆Xnt is positive but statistically signiﬁcantly, again consistent with
the assumption that output and input quotas are diverted independently by diﬀerent oﬃcials.
The estimates of the coeﬃcients on lnMi
nt and lnWnt are all positive as predicted, but they
are not as precisely estimated as to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
In theory, one should be able to improve the precision of the GMM estimates by increasing
the sample size. Since Xnt has more missing observations than Qnt, the sample size in the GMM
regression can be raised signiﬁcantly if ∆Xnt, which in theory should be excluded, is dropped
from the regression. The GMM estimates with ∆Xnt excluded are reported in Column 2.
Excluding ∆Xnt increases the number of observations from 2261 to 3655 and the t-ratios of
the estimates markedly. But it reduces the size of the estimated coeﬃcient on ∆lnMi
nt. This
is not surprising. Given that the estimate of the coeﬃcient on ∆Xnt is positive and that by
symmetry an increase in Xnt should decrease lnMi
nt, excluding ∆Xnt is expected to reduce
the estimate on the coeﬃcient of ∆lnMi
nt.
In sum, the evidence shows that the allocation of both in-plan and outside-plan resources
between 1980 and 1989 in China exhibits strong empirical patterns, and that these patterns
support the joint hypothesis of oﬃcial diversion and imperfectly competitive product markets.
5 Conclusion
Exploiting a unique data set containing detailed transactions data from a panel of 769 Chinese
state-owned enterprises, this paper tests microeconomic implications of corruption—oﬃcial
diversion of in-plan industrial goods—on resource allocation. It ﬁnds that corruption has
a signiﬁcant impact on the allocation of both in-plan and outside-plan resources under the
dual-track system in China in ways consistent with the predictions of an extended version of
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) model of corruption. Regression analysis of the determination
of in-plan quotas reveals that a decrease in the plan price—part of the marginal cost that
the corrupt oﬃcial faces—increases the procurement of goods into the plan for the purpose of
diversion. It also reveals that an increase in the marginal cost of production that a ﬁrm faces,
which raises the market price of its product and hence the marginal beneﬁt from diverting the
product, will induce the oﬃcial to raise the procurement quota on the product for purposes
of diversion. Interestingly, the evidence shows that there is little qualitative diﬀerence in how
14diversion aﬀected the allocation of in-plan resources before and after the price liberalization
in 1985. The evidence thus suggests that corruption existed before 1985, and that corrupt
oﬃcials made diversion decisions based on the implicit prices embodied in favors and in-kind
bribes. An important implication of this ﬁnding is that the introduction of the market track
in China per se did not cause corruption. The culprit was China’s reliance on planning, which
gave government oﬃcials the control over resource allocation and therefore the institutional
incentive to be corrupt (see Rose-Ackerman (1999) for a general discussion).
But the Chinese reform may still have changed the nature of oﬃcial diversion. On the
one hand, by allowing ﬁrms to sell their products directly to customers (and by lowering the
entry barriers for non-state ﬁrms), the reform introduced market competition and reduced the
market power of corrupt oﬃcials. Regression analysis of the market pricing equation reveals
that the introduction of market competition, ceteris paribus, resulted in lower market prices
and hence lower corruption distortions. On the other habd, by creating markets and hence
monetizing corruption, the reform may have reduced the transaction costs of corruption and
therefore helped spread corruption. In addition, the widening of the gap between market and
plan prices as documented in Table 1 would certainly have also encouraged oﬃcial diversion.
The net eﬀect could well be increased pervasiveness of corruption in the late 1980s.
The evidence here reveals that the dual-track system, in spite of its desirable properties
(e.g., Li, 1999; Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000), had a serious downside: it maintained the
plan that was the source of oﬃcial diversion. This particular corruption turned out to be
transitional. As product markets gradually replaced the plan in allocating industrial products
in the late 1990s, oﬃcial diversion of industrial products gradually faded away. But anecdotal
evidence suggests that corrupt oﬃcials in China have found greener pastures elsewhere (e.g.,
the ﬁnancial sector where governmental control remains strong, see Huang (1996)).
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17A Appendix
The data come from a survey of 769 Chinese state-owned enterprises. Annual data between
1980 and 1989 are collected retrospectively. The sample covers a diverse selection of state-
owned ﬁrms. Located in four provinces (Jiangsu, Jilin, Shanxi, and Sichuan), these ﬁrms
represent 36 (out of a total of 40) two-digit industries in mining, logging, utilities, and man-
ufacturing. The data contain rich information on each ﬁrm’s participation in the dual-track
system, giving details on the plan and the market prices (as chained indexes) that each ﬁrm
faced as well as the amounts of outputs and inputs transacted at these prices. Below I give
a brief description of the available price and quantity index variables. Details on how these
variables are constructed can be found in Li (1997).
A. Price indexes and wage rate
Detailed data on price indexes (or inﬂation rates) and the ratios of market to plan prices in
each ﬁrm for each ﬁrm are collected in the survey. The data allow the construction of indexes of
market prices of output, Pi
nt ≡ Pnt/Pn,80, market prices of material inputs, Mi
nt ≡ Mnt/Mn,80,
plan prices of output, pi
nt ≡ pnt/pn,80, and plan prices of material inputs, mi
nt ≡ mnt/mn,80,
for each ﬁrm n. Here Pn,80, Mn,80, pn,80 and mn,80 denote the ﬁrm-speciﬁc base-year (1980)
prices, which are unobserved. The base wage rate, Wnt, is measured as the base wage per
worker in year t.
Note that the “market prices” before the price liberalization in January 1985 were “ﬂoating
prices” and remained under price control. The weighted average annual rates of market price
inﬂation and the gaps between market prices and plan prices for both output and material
inputs are reported in Table 1.
B. Output quota and input quota
For each ﬁrm, real output quota Qnt and real input quota Xnt, measured in 1989 market
prices,11 are available. Zero output quota accounts for 22% of all observations between 1980
and 1989 for which output quota is not missing, while zero input quota accounts for 49% of all
observations for which input quota is not missing. These statistics suggest that at any given
time more ﬁrms were required to sell their output at plan prices than were given inputs at
plan prices. Furthermore, as Table 1 shows, the proportion of output sold at market prices
was lower than the proportion of input bought at market prices in each year in the sample.
11Since market prices in 1989 — the last year in the sample — were presumably less distortionary than either
plan prices or market prices in earlier years,all quantity variables are measured in 1989 market prices to make





Figure 1: Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) model of corruption. The oﬃcial, acting as a bribe-
maximizing monopolist, restricts the supply of a government-produced good from Qg to Qb.
 









MC = p + G (δQ)
P(Q,M,W)
Figure 2: Equilibrium solution to the two-stage game between the ﬁrm and the oﬃcial. Panel
A shows the determination of the ﬁrm’s optimal market pricing for any given Q and X.
Panel B shows the determination of output quota, Q, as the oﬃcial maximizes diversion rents
anticipating the ﬁrm’s pricing decision.
19Table 1: Dual-track system as seen from a sample of state-owned enterprises covering 36 2-digit
industries.
Output Material Inputs




b sold to quota price
market P
plan P
f bought from quota
inﬂationa marketc per ﬁrmd inﬂatione marketg per ﬁrmd
1981 0.6% 1.03 26.0% 32.2 1.3% 1.22 27.5% 16.0
1982 2.4% 1.05 27.5% 30.4 1.0% 1.16 29.7% 16.8
1983 2.2% 1.04 25.8% 32.0 2.0% 1.31 27.5% 21.5
1984 3.2% 1.06 25.7% 33.9 7.1% 1.24 32.2% 20.4
1985 7.3% 1.16 26.4% 36.2 5.2% 1.30 39.4% 20.6
1986 9.3% 1.26 24.9% 37.7 19.0% 1.41 44.7% 17.4
1987 4.6% 1.17 25.1% 45.6 11.9% 1.63 50.0% 17.1
1988 22.0% 1.16 25.9% 45.2 39.6% 1.84 56.5% 14.1
1989 21.2% 1.39 25.0% 44.2 18.7% 2.17 56.4% 14.1
∗ Prior to 1985, market prices were measured as “ﬂoating” prices, which remained under price con-
trol. By excluding possible in-kind payoﬀs and the costs of queuing, “ﬂoating” prices perhaps
underestimated the implicit market-clearing prices.
a Percentage change in market prices from the previous year, weighted by sales measured in market
prices.
b Weighted by sales measured in plan prices.
c Weighted by sales measured in market prices.
d Million yuan, measured in 1989 market prices.
e Percentage change in market prices from the previous year, weighted by input purchases measured
in market prices.
f Weighted by input purchases measured in plan prices.
g Weighted by input purchases measured in market prices.
20Table 2: Comparative statics results.
Perfect competition Imperfect competition
Eﬀect on Q Eﬀect on X Eﬀect on P Eﬀect on Q Eﬀect on X
Q NA NA − NA NA
X NA NA 0N A N A
P +0 NA NA NA
p − 0 0 − 0
M 0+++ 1 NA
m 0 − 00 −
W 00++ 1 0
M∗ NA 0 NA NA +1
W∗ NA 0 NA NA +1
NA = not applicable.
1 Under the assumption that the marginal beneﬁt of diversion, MB = P + Q∂P/∂Q,
is increasing in M and W.
21Table 3: Estimation of the output quota equation (6) using Honor´ e’s semi-parametric ﬁxed-
eﬀects Tobit. The dependent variables, Qnt, are measured in 1989 market prices in 10 million
yuan. For speciﬁcations under the hypothesis of perfectly competitive product markets, an
additional regressor, “log market output price” is added. The time-speciﬁc eﬀects, estimated by
including year dummies in the regression, are not reported below. Estimation and hypothesis
testing are done using Pantob, a library of GAUSS routines provided by Bo Honor´ e. The
estimator uses the absolute value loss function. The numbers reported in parentheses are
t-ratios (asymptotically normal statistics).
Imperfectly competitive mkts Perfectly competitive mkts
1980–89 1980–84 1985–89 1980–89 1980–84 1985–89
Log market output price, lnPi
nt -0.157 -0.319 -0.107
(-1.227) (-1.539) (-0.887)
Log plan output price, lnpi
nt -0.534 -0.730 -0.566 -0.421 -0.430 -0.472
(-4.821) (-6.968) (-5.087) (-3.248) (-2.327) (-4.080)
Log market input price, lnMi
nt 0.419 0.374 0.420 0.489 0.515 0.444
(3.676) (3.103) (3.740) (4.321) (4.113) (3.822)
Log plan input price, lnmi
nt -0.175 -0.053 -0.157 -0.199 -0.147 -0.125
(-1.686) (-0.466) (-1.376) (-1.944) (-1.336) (-1.153)
Log base wage rate, lnWnt 0.395 0.115 0.655 0.396 -0.091 0.610
(4.986) (1.390) (4.702) (5.021) (-0.869) (4.594)
Observations [% censored] 7086 [22%]
22Table 4: Estimation of the input quota equation (7) using Honor´ e’s semi-parametric ﬁxed-
eﬀects Tobit. The dependent variable, Xnt, is measured in 1989 market prices in 10 million
yuan. For speciﬁcations under the hypothesis of perfectly competitive product markets, two
additional regressors, “log market output price” and “log market input price” are added. The
time-speciﬁc eﬀects, estimated by including year dummies in the regression, are not reported
below. Estimation and hypothesis testing are done using Pantob, a library of GAUSS routines
provided by Bo Honor´ e. The estimator uses the absolute value loss function. The numbers
reported in parentheses are t-ratios (asymptotically normal statistics).
Imperfectly competitive mkts Perfectly competitive mkts
1980–89 1980–84 1985–89 1980–89 1980–84 1985–89
Log market output price, lnPi
nt 0.131 -0.099 0.077
(2.032) (-0.661) (1.141)
Log plan output price, lnpi
nt 0.048 0.096 0.048 -0.062 0.225 -0.022
(0.985) (1.572) (0.912) (-1.073) (1.585) (-0.343)
Log market input price, lnMi
nt -0.225 -0.158 -0.224
(-2.725) (-2.246) (-2.418)
Log plan input price, lnmi
nt -0.186 -0.159 -0.187 -0.014 -0.060 -0.024
(-3.384) (-2.889) (-3.313) (-0.165) (-0.682) (-0.261)
Log base wage rate, lnWnt 0.027 -0.035 0.194 0.037 -0.059 0.212
(0.582) (-0.613) (2.900) (0.825) (-1.110) (3.245)
Observations [% censored] 4434 [49%]
23Table 5: GMM estimation of the output pricing equation (8) between 1985 and 1989. The
dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the logarithm of market output price index,
∆lnPi
nt. Not reported here are time-speciﬁc eﬀects, which are estimated by including year
dummies in each regression. Instrumental variables for GMM estimation are a constant, year
dummies, and four exogenous variables (∆lnMi
nt,∆l nWnt,∆l npi
nt,a n d∆l nmi
nt).
Year-on-year change in
Output quota, ∆Qnt -0.292 -0.289
(-3.13) (-4.87)
Input quota, ∆Xnt 0.420
(1.03)
Log market input price, ∆lnMi
nt 0.634 0.151
(1.38) (1.76)




Year dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 2261 3655
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